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1. THE IMPACT OF ENTRY REGULATIONS ON 
BUSINESS GROWTH 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The creation of new businesses is a key part of the process of creative destruction that is 
argued to be a key ingredient in spurring economic growth. Young firms are not only 
seen to have an important role in bringing innovations to the market and in aiding the 
diffusion of new technologies, but also in raising the competitive pressure on incumbents. 
This provides incentives for incumbent firms to raise their own efficiency, as well as 
aiding the reallocation of resources from lower to higher productivity businesses, all of 
which gives a further stimulus to productivity and economic growth.  
The business sector in Spain has, however, historically been characterised by relatively 
low birth rates, a relatively high share of low-productivity, micro firms and a relatively 
low incidence of high-growth firms. It has been argued that one contributory factor is the 
set of entry requirements for new businesses in Spain (see, for example: Gonzalez-
Pandiella, 2014; Bank of Spain, 2015); these entry requirements are relatively high when 
compared with a number of other European countries. Such entry barriers have a clear 
justification in the presence of market failures and for reasons of public protection. 
However, theory and empirical evidence supports the view that higher entry 
requirements can hamper the creation of new firms, thereby muting the dynamism of the 
market, with attendant consequences for business competitiveness and growth.  
The government of Spain has undertaken a number of reforms since 2012 to reduce the 
barriers to entry for new firms. For instance, the process of business registration has 
been made easier and faster, and some administrative requirements for small firms have 
been simplified. These have led to measurable improvements in the business 
environment facing potential entrepreneurs in Spain. However, the barriers facing 
potential entrants remain higher than in many other major, advanced economies. They 
also vary to notable degrees across Spain’s nineteen Autonomous Cities and 
Communities. The extent of such barriers is seen as an impediment to further progress in 
boosting the dynamism and competitiveness of Spain’s economy (OECD, 2017a; 
European Commission, 2017).  
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between entry barriers and business 
dynamics in order to identify the economic rationale for further reforms to the 
administrative environment governing business entry in Spain. We combine quantitative 
indicators of the barriers to entry for new firms with the latest available data on business 
demography, thus taking account of the progress made by Spain in the early stages of its 
reform process (2012-15). We undertake analyses at the level of the nation state, 
comparing Spain with other major European economies, but also at the regional level, 
exploring the implications of inter-regional heterogeneity in entry requirements between 
Spain’s Autonomous Cities and Communities.  
In both samples, we find that the height of entry barriers depresses firm birth rates and 
raises the average size of newly-born enterprises. Our results imply that further reforms 
to the administrative environment governing business entry in Spain – both at the 
national and regional level – would yield economic benefits in terms of higher rates of 
business creation. However, our results also indicate that the lowering of entry barriers is 
not sufficient, on its own, to raise overall levels of business dynamism and growth. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 first provides a review of theory and 
empirical evidence on the relationship between entry regulations and rates of business 
creation, and the relationship between business entry and other aspects of market 
dynamism. Section 1.3 then provides an overview of the degree of business dynamism 
and the extent of entry barriers in Spain, by way of context for our empirical analysis. 
ection 1.4 outlines the methodology for our analysis, with the results being presented in 
Section 1.5. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes and discusses some of the potential policy 
implications of our findings in more detail.  
1.2. Theoretical framework and existing literature 
Although the positive contribution of entrepreneurship to business dynamics and growth 
is widely recognised (Audretsch et al, 2006; Syverson, 2011), most countries place some 
restrictions on those wishing to register a new firm. In some cases, this may simply 
involve a requirement to register with the national tax office. In others, the entrepreneur 
may have to give notification to the local municipal authorities, obtain an official 
identification number for the business or even obtain a licence to operate. Many countries 
require those wishing to establish a limited liability company to undertake additional 
steps, including the deposit of a minimum amount of paid-up capital. 
A certain amount of regulation or bureaucracy may be justified on the basis of public 
interest, particularly where there is risk of market failure (Pigou, 1938). For instance, 
governments may seek to screen new entrants in order to protect consumers from low 
quality goods or services or to protect third parties from negative externalities such as 
pollution. Registration and screening can also provide protection for creditors and 
generate information to aid aspects of public administration – notably tax collection. 
However, there is a growing recognition that high entry barriers may also have economic 
costs, reducing the rate at which new firms enter the marketplace and thus muting the 
disciplinary effects of competition on economic growth.1  
The first-order effects come from the impact that greater procedural or capital 
requirements have in raising the overall cost of entry.2 Such entry costs may discourage 
entrepreneurs from establishing new businesses, thus lowering the overall entry rate. 
Since these costs are largely fixed, they may also particularly discourage those with 
limited resources, thereby limiting the inflow of small young firms. The second-order 
effects come via the reduction in competitive pressure that these small, young entrants 
would otherwise exert on incumbents. Lower entry rates thus tend to go hand-in-hand 
with lower exit rates and lower growth trajectories for incumbent firms (see Brandt, 
2004).  
Evidence on the potential first-order effects comes from a variety of sources. Desai et al 
(2003) use a cross-country approach with industry fixed effects to estimate regressions 
of the impact of entry regulations on firm entry and size with a single year of 
industry*country data for Europe. Using indicators of start-up procedures from the World 
Bank (Djankov, 2002), they find that countries with higher entry barriers have lower firm 
entry rates (once other institutional factors are controlled for) and higher average firm 
size. Van Stel et al (2006) extend this approach by adding a time dimension to their 
industry*country panel (albeit with a broader focus on rates on entrepreneurship) and 
find that higher minimum capital requirements are a key factor. Scarpetta et al (2002) 
and Brandt (2004) also use industry*country panels but employ indicators of the barriers 
to entrepreneurship from the OECD’s Product Market Regulation database. Both find a 
negative association between the extent of administrative barriers on start-up firms and 
firm entry rates.3 
                                                 
1 Entry barriers are, of course, only one determinant of rates of business creation. For a wider view of the large 
array of potential determinants of entrepreneurship, see OECD (2016: 13). 
2 Cost is broadly defined here in terms of the monetary cost arising from fees and capital requirements but also 
the opportunity cost of complying with administrative procedures.  
3 Bjornskov and Foss (2008) and Nystrom (2008) pursue similar approaches to those studies mentioned here, 
using data from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index’ (although this index contains no detailed 
measure of entry requirements, providing only more-general indicators of the business environment).  
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However, despite the inclusion of industry fixed-effects, causal inference is difficult in this 
empirical framework as omitted country characteristics may be jointly driving the nature 
of regulation and economic outcomes. Some have addressed this problem through the 
use of a ‘difference-in-differences’ (DiD) approach, taking a lead from Rajan and 
Zingales’ (1998) efforts to identify the impact of a country’s financial development on 
economic growth. The key insight in this approach is that the costs or benefits arising 
from the institutional environment are not felt equally by all firms, and so the difference 
in outcomes between those most and least affected firms will vary across institutional 
environments at a given point in time. This focus on the interaction between an industry 
characteristic and the institutional environment permits an econometric specification in 
which it is possible to include both industry and country fixed-effects, thereby reducing 
concerns about omittedvariables.  
Those applying the DiD methodology to the case of entry regulations assume that some 
industry sectors have higher ‘natural’ rates of entry than others, and that the difference 
in economic outcomes between these ‘naturally high-entry’ and ‘naturally low-entry’ 
industry sectors will vary across countries with more or less-stringent entry regulations.4 
Klapper et al (2006) and Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) both use the World Bank 
indicators from Djankov et al (2002) to estimate the impact of entry regulations on firm 
birth rates in a country*industry cross-section, using this approach. Klapper et al (2006) 
focus particularly on the financial costs of entry, whilst Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) 
focus on the time taken. Both find that higher entry requirements reduce firm entry 
rates, whilst Klapper et al (2006) also show a positive effect on the size of entrants.   
A further set of studies have focused on particular countries. Bripi (2013) uses the DiD 
approach to study the effects of differences in start-up procedures across the provinces 
of Italy, finding that lengthier and more costly procedures reduce entry rates for limited 
liability firms. Similarly, Garcia-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) use the approach to 
look at the impact of the judiciary on firm entry rates in Spain, employing a regional 
measure of the efficiency of the judicial system as their institutional indicator.  
Others have focused on specific instances of policy reform within particular countries. 
Branstetter et al (2014) studied the establishment of ‘one-stop shops’ in Portugal which 
simplified incorporation procedures (reducing the time required for incorporation from 
several months to approximately one hour) and significantly reduced administrative fees 
(from around 2,000 Euro to less than 400 Euro). They found that the reforms increased 
the number of monthly start-ups by approximately 17% and the number of new jobs by 
22%, although many of the new firms were of low quality. Yakovlev and Zhuracskaya 
(2007) studied the effects of reforms that were introduced in Russia between 2001 and 
2004. The reforms required that registering a business would involve a visit to just one 
government agency and would take no more than one week, that each inspecting agency 
would come to inspect a business no more once every two years, and that some business 
activities which previously had required licenses would become exempt from licensing. 
They found that the reforms had a large, significant positive effect on entry rates and 
employment for small and medium-sized firms. Elsewhere, Bruhn (2011) and Kaplan et 
al (2011) studied the creation of a Rapid Business Opening System (SARE) for ‘low-risk’ 
industries in Mexico which led to reductions in: the average number of days required to 
register a business (from 30 to1); the number of procedures (from 8 to 3); and the 
required number of office visits (from 4 to 1). They found that the reform increased the 
entry rate and wage levels, reduced the income of incumbents and also reduced prices.5  
                                                 
4 The key assumption is that there are no omitted variables at the country*industry level which affect firm birth 
rates.  
5 Other related studies include those by Monteiro and Assuncao (2012), Chari (2011), Sharma (2009) and 
Bertrand and Kramarz.(2002). 
Second-order effects 
As noted earlier, if entry barriers limit the establishment of small, young firms, then they 
could also have second-order negative effects by limiting the process of creative 
destruction which would otherwise incentivise incumbents to grow or even push older, 
low-productivity firms out of the market. A number of theoretical models give new 
entrants a prominent role in bringing new technologies or product innovations to the 
market (Cabellero and Hammour, 1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991), thereby pressuring or replacing incumbents which rely on older vintages 
of capital or out-dated products and processes.  
A variety of studies have shown the importance of entry rates in driving dynamism and 
growth in this vein. For instance, Foster et al (1998) decompose aggregate productivity 
growth in the US into the contributions of entrants, exiters and incumbents, showing that 
the process of firm entry and exit played a substantial role in reallocating resources from 
low to higher productivity units. Aghion et al (2004) use panel data on British 
establishments to show that higher levels of entry by foreign firms led to faster total 
factor productivity growth of domestic incumbent firms and thus to faster aggregate 
productivity growth. More generally, Brandt (2004) shows that high rates of firm entry 
tend to coincide with rapid growth of productivity, output and employment. For Spain, 
Callejon and Segarra (1999) and Martin-Marcos and Jaumandreu (2004) both show that 
both entry and exit rates have both contributed positively to the growth of total factor 
productivity in industries and in regions, whilst Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2009) point to 
the high growth rates of new entrants.  
Nevertheless, only a few studies have looked directly at the association between entry 
regulations and ‘second-order’ indicators such as firm growth and productivity. Klapper et 
al (2006) do so and find a sizeable impact of entry regulations on rates of productivity 
growth among inbumbent firms, but the magnitude of the effect reduces once an attempt 
is made to address potential endogeneity bias via instrumental-variables estimation. Bripi 
(2013) also finds modest effects (though without attempting to address endogeneity). 
The modest effects in these studies thus serve as a reminder that entry rates are only 
one factor in shaping broader levels of business dynamism and growth, which can also be 
critically affected inter alia by the presence of size-dependent regulations, credit 
conditions and barriers to trade and investment (see Gonzalez-Pandiella, 2014: 17-19). 
In summary, then, theory and empirical evidence support the view that higher entry 
requirements can hamper the creation of new firms, thereby potentially muting the 
dynamism of the market, with attendant consequences for business competitiveness and 
growth. This is not to say that lowering entry requirements are universally beneficial. As 
noted earlier, some element of administrative screening can be in the public interest. 
Lowering entry barriers has also been shown to have short term employment costs 
(Bassanini and Cingano, 2018), and may bring in firms that are below average quality 
(Branstetter et al, 2010), such that the medium-term benefits are below expectations. It 
is also the case that other features of the institutional environment – such as credit 
conditions – can hold back growth. However, if these other features are favourable, the 
longer-term expectation is of a more dynamic business sector, which promotes positive 
outcomes at the level of the economy as a whole. 
1.3. Business dynamics and entry barriers in Spain 
Having reviewed some of the theory and prior evidence, we now go on to provide some 
contextual evidence on levels of business dynamism and entry barriers in Spain, as a 
prelude to our empirical analysis.  
Business dynamics in Spain 
Evidence on comparative levels of business dynamism in Spain is provided by Eurostat as 
part of its suite of Business Demography statistics. We use the latest-available wave of 
data, which gives various indicators of business dynamics for the year 2015 across 25 
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European countries, including Spain.6 We focus on aggregate figures for NACE Rev. 2 
Sections B-N, after excluding the activities of holding companies (NACE Rev. 2 Group 
64.2).  
The first panel of Figure 1.1 shows that the firm birth rate in Spain is just below average 
by EU standards, standing at 9% in 2015. The rate itself has risen slightly in recent 
years, but Spain’s ranking among EU countries has remained fairly stable over this time. 
The rate itself is less than two-thirds of that found in the UK and Portugal, with the latter 
having seen a notable increase in its own entry rate (from 12% to 16%) over the period 
2012-15. The second panel of Figure 1.1 then examines the average size of newly-born 
enteprises in 2015. The average size of new firms in Spain is just above the EU average. 
This is notionally in line with Spain’s lower-than-average birth rate and, indeed, a 
number of countries with relatively low birth rates also have relatively large entrants 
(Greece, Austria and Germany, for example). However, the corrleation between the two 
series is weak overall, and the UK is notable for sitting to the right of both charts.  
Figure 1.2 goes on to examine the death rate of firms and the overall rate of churn in the 
business population (‘churn’ being defined as the sum of the birth and death rates). 
Spain again sits in the middle of the set of 25 EU countries, some way below the UK and 
Portugal. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 then show the shares of high-growth firms and young high-
growth firms (gazelles) in each country. Spain performs relatively well in 2015 in terms 
of the share of high-growth firms, but this point-in-time comparison hides considerable 
upward movement over time, with Spain having ranked in the lower third of countries 
just two years prior. This may reflect the comparatively strong performance of the 
Spanish economy in the period 2014-2015. The share of gazelles is observed for only 12 
of the 25 countries but, here, Spain’s ranking has remained stubbornly low, with no 
notable improvement over the period.  
This picture of relatively low rates of growth among new firms is supported by Figure 1.5, 
which shows the average size of enterprises born in 2011, by age. In the UK and 
Germany, the average 5-year old firm in this cohort was around 70 per cent larger than 
the average 1-year old firm had been four years previously. In Portugal, the figure was 
around 55 per cent. However, in Spain (and Italy), the average 5-year old firm was just 
25 per cent larger than the average 1-year old firm.  
Spain therefore tends currently to sit either in the middle or towards the lower end of the 
EU distribution on most of the measures of business dynamism presented here. It is 
generally ranked some way below the most dynamic economies, such as the UK, but also 
some way behind its near neighbour Portugal, which has seen the benefits of recent 
reforms to its entry procedures for new firms (see previous section). Spain has improved 
on some measures, but there is notable room for further progress, particuarly in respect 
of the share of young start-ups. 
                                                 
6 The 25 countries comprise 24 Member States and Norway. The remaining Member States of Denmark, Malta, 
Cyprus and Poland each have various amounts of missing data for the chosen year. 
Figure 1.1: Birth rate and average size of newly-born enterprises, 2015 
 
 
Notes: NACE Rev.2 Section B-N (exc. activities of holding companies) 
Source: Eurostat Business Demography Statistics [bd_9ac_l_form_r2] 
 
Figure 1.2: Death rate and churn rate, 2015 
 
 
Notes: NACE Rev.2 Section B-N (exc. activities of holding companies) 
Source: Eurostat Business Demography Statistics [bd_9ac_l_form_r2] 
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Figure 1.3: Share of high-growth enterprises, 2013 and 2015 
 
Notes: NACE Rev.2 Section B-N (exc. activities of holding companies). Number of high-
growth enterprises measured in employment. 
Source: Eurostat Business Demography Statistics [bd_9pm_r2] 
 
Figure 1.4: Share of young high-growth firms (gazelles), 2013 and 2015 
Notes: NACE Rev.2 Section B-N (exc. activities of holding companies). Number of young 
high-growth firms measured in employment. 
Source: Eurostat Business Demography Statistics [bd_9pm_r2] 
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Figure 1.5: Average size of enterprises born in 2011, by age  
 
Notes: NACE Rev.2 Section B-N (exc. activities of holding companies).  
Source: Eurostat Business Demography Statistics [bd_9bd_sz_cl_r2] 
 
Barriers to entrepreneurship 
It has long been recognised that those wishing to start a new business in Spain have 
faced greater administrative burdens and a greater complexity of procedures than in 
many other advanced economies.  
The OECD last charted these entry barriers as part of the 2013 update to its Product 
Market Regulation Database (Koske et al, 2013) (i.e. near the beginning of the recent 
reform process in Spain). The OECD methodology involved the compilation of a large 
number of numerical indicators across three main headings: the administrative barriers 
on start-ups; the complexity of regulatory procedures; and the regulatory protection of 
incumbents; the results are summarised in Table 1.1.7 Spain ranked 32nd overall among 
35 OECD countries in 2013, with its low overall ranking driven by its comparatively high 
level of administrative burdens and procedural complexity. Among the four countries 
specifically highlighted in Table 1.1 (Spain, the UK, France and Germany), Spain ranked 
lowest on the sub-index for ‘Administrative burdens on start-ups’ and also on the sub-
index for ‘Complexity of regulatory procedures’, whilst Germany ranked lowest on 
‘Regulatory protection of incumbents’. 
  
                                                 
7 The indices are compiled from closed questions that can either be answered with numerical values (e.g. the 
number of bodies that need to be contacted to start a business) or by selecting an answer from a pre-defined 
list. The coded information is normalised over a zero to six scale, where a lower value reflects a more 
competition-friendly regulatory stance. 
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Table 1.1: OECD Barriers to Entrepreneurship Index, 2013 
 Index value (lower = more 
competition-friendly) 
Rank (among 35 OECD 
countries)  
Spain Min Max Median Spain UK FR DE 
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
(overall index) 
2.10  1.15 2.78 1.69 32 9 17 15 
Administrative 
burdens on start-ups 
(sub-index) 
2.34  0.92 3.08 1.97 26 9 24 14 
Administrative burdens 
for corporations 
1.60  0.00 2.60 1.60 17 4 29 6 
Administrative burdens 
for sole-proprietors 
1.40  0.00 2.60 0.80 29 5 14 5 
Barriers in service sectors 4.01  1.15 4.62 3.40 28 13 25 20 
Complexity of 
regulatory procedures 
(sub-index) 
2.83  0.41 3.75 1.85 31 26 15 19 
Licences and permits 
system 
4.67  0.00 6.00 2.67 27 27 5 13 
Communication and 
simplification of rules and 
procedures 
0.99  0.00 1.50 0.59 27 11 30 32 
Regulatory protection 
of incumbents (sub-
index) 
1.15  0.64 2.72 1.30 12 1 19 23 
Legal barriers 1.30  0.20 2.00 0.90 25 12 22 6 
Anti-trust exemptions 0.00  0.00 2.95 0.00 1 25 1 32 
Barriers in network 
sectors 
2.14  0.97 3.95 2.69 4 1 21 9 
 Source: OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (Koske et al, 2014) 
 
Some have linked the lack of business dynamism in Spain to these comparatively high 
entry barriers (Gonzalez-Pandiella, 2014; Bank of Spain, 2015) and, in 2012, the Spanish 
Government began a program to reduce the administrative burdens for new firms, as 
part of the broader program of national reform to improve Spanish competitiveness and 
foster economic growth.  
The Spanish Government created the Commission on the Reform of the Spanish Public 
Administration (CORA by its Spanish acronym) in October 2012, with one sub-
commission charged with reducing administrative barriers to economic activity. The sub-
commission put forward a range of proposals, and these have led to a number of 
significant initiatives to facilitate the establishment of new businesses (see Box 1.1). 
  
 The process of reform proposed by the CORA has been monitored through the creation of 
(in June 2013) of the Office for the Implementation of Reform in Public Administration 
(OPERA), which documents the progress of the reform program through a series of 
quarterly and annual reports.8  
These reforming initiatives have built on the progress that had already made prior to 
2012 (for example, in making it easier for individual entrepreneurs to register a business 
electronically). Spain’s overall progress can be observed through reference to the World 
Bank’s Doing Business (DB) indicators, which measure the number of procedures 
required to register a business in Spain, along with the time and cost, for each year from 
                                                 
8 See http://www.sefp.minhafp.gob.es/en/web/areas/reforma_aapp/actuaciones-
informes.html 
Box 1.1: Initiatives to facilitate the establishment of new businesses in Spain 
 Eliminating the requirement for a municipal licence to open commercial 
premises with an area of less than 300 square metres (Law 19/2012 of 25th May 
2013; enacted December 2012). Later extended to cover permanent 
establishments with a retail area not exceeding 750 m² (Law 20/2013). 
 Eliminating some other formalities previously required for business start-up, 
such as the verification of the record of Labour Inspectorate visits (an initiative 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in July 2013). 
 Easing and speeding up the process of business registration process (Law 
14/2013): 
o ‘Entrepreneur Service Point’ (PAE) created a ‘one-stop shop’ for business 
information and start-up, integrating the previous network of business 
service desks (VUE) and Consulting and Process Initiation Points (PAIT).  
o Single Electronic Document (DUE) can be completed and filed via the PAE 
or online.  
o DUE submitted via the Business Information and Creation Network 
(CIRCE) to the Tax Authorities, Social Security Authorities and 
local/regional government offices. 
o Time limits for the Commercial Registry to issue a certificate of 
registration. 
 Law 14/2013 also: 
o introduced a new form of company, the Gradually Established Limited 
Liability Company (SLFS), which reduced the initial costs of incorporating 
a company by removed the minimum initial capital requirement 
(previously 3,000 Euros).  
o Creation of Entrepreneurial Limited Liability (E.L.L.), allowing individuals 
to avoid liability for business debts from affecting their primary residence 
o Support for the provision of residency visas for non-EU entrepreneurs 
o Reduction in income tax (of 20%) for investments made in new 
companies 
o Simplification of health and safety law for small enterprises 
o Simplified accounting requirements for small companies 
 Development of model byelaws to expedite the incorporation procedure via 
CIRCE (Royal Decree 421/2015) 
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2005-2018. These data are based on the administrative environment facing a start-up 
firm in Madrid, the capital, and comparable data are available from the World Bank for 
many other countries (again based capital cities).9 These metrics are less detailed than 
those collated by the OECD (see Table 1.1) but have the considerable advantage of being 
updated on an annual basis. 
Figure 1.6 shows Spain’s trajectory on these indicators over the period 2008-2018, 
compared with the major European economies of France, Germany and the UK. Spain 
has clearly improved its position over the past 5-6 years, and now sits above Germany in 
the World Bank’s overall rankings for the ease of starting a business (86th out of 190 
countries, compared with Germany’s ranking of 113th). However, Spain is still some way 
below France (ranked 25th) and the UK (ranked 14th).  
Within Europe, Spain sits roughly at the 75th percentile in terms of the number of 
procedural steps required to start a business, the time taken, the cost and the minimum 
amount of paid-up capital required. At present seven procedural steps are required to 
start a typical business in Madrid, taking 13 days and costing 4.8% of per capita income. 
The minimum capital requirement is typically 12.5% of per capita income. By 
comparison, in the UK, business start-up typically requires 4 procedural steps, taking 4.5 
days with zero cost and requiring zero paid-up capital.  
Figure 1.6: Entry regulations in Spain over time 
Source: World Bank: Doing Business Annual Reports 
Regional heterogeneity within Spain 
                                                 
9 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
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The regional devolution of competencies within Spain mean that the specific entry 
requirements also have a degree of spatial variation across Spain, as regions have used 
their devolved powers to set their own procedural requirements. This spatial variation 
can be mapped via a specific sub-national analysis that was conducted by the World Bank 
in 2015. Figure 1.7 shows the variation across the 19 Autonomous Cities and 
Communities of Spain in terms of the number of procedures required to start a business, 
the time taken and the cost as a percentage of per capita income.10 Regions such as 
Navarre and Galicia tend to sit towards the top of these charts (having more extensive 
barriers), whereas regions such as Andalusia and Cantabria tend to sit towards the 
bottom. The community of Madrid also sits near the bottom, indicating that the World 
Bank’s national rankings for Spain understate the regulatory burden faced by the average 
business in Spain. 
In a departure from the methodology used for their national reports, the World Bank’s 
sub-national report for Spain also measured the administrative requirements for setting 
up an industrial SME (using the stylised example of a manufacturer of steel products). 
The inter-regional variation is even greater here, particularly in respect of the time taken 
(Figure 1.8). It is also notable that the regions’ scores are broadly uncorrelated across 
the two series (r=-0.02), with the Community of Madrid ranking only 9th among 19 
regions for the ease of setting up an industrial SME. The two measures therefore need to 
be viewed in combination in order to provide a more comprehensive portrait of the 
degree of inter-regional diversity within Spain. 
 
Figure 1.7: Regional variance across Spain in entry regulations for a standard business, 
2015  
 
Source: World Bank: Doing Business Subnational Report for Spain 2015 
                                                 
10 These 19 Autonomous Cities and Communities correspond to NUTS2-level regions. 
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Figure 1.8: Regional variance across Spain in entry regulations for an industrial SME, 
2015 
 
Source: World Bank: Doing Business Subnational Report for Spain 2015 
 
1.4. Methods and data 
In the remainder of the report, we combine the World Bank’s quantitative indicators of 
the entry barriers for new firms with the latest available data on business demography to 
investigate the relationship between entry barriers and business dynamics. We undertake 
analyses at the level of the nation state, comparing Spain with other major European 
economies, and also at the regional level, exploring the implications of inter-regional 
heterogeneity in entry requirements between Spain’s Autonomous Cities and 
Communities.  
We take a two-step approach: first, estimating the impact of entry barriers on firm birth 
rates and the average size of newly-born firms (what we have termed the ‘first-order 
effects’); and second, estimating the potential implications of higher birth rates for other 
indicators of business dynamism, namely death rates and the share of high-growth firms 
(what we term the ‘second-order effects’).11 In the following sub-sections, we outline our 
methods, which apply generally to both the country-level and region-level analyses, 
before going on to provide overviews of our various data sources.  
                                                 
11 This is not to imply that the causal path runs only from entry to exit: exogenous shocks which raise exit rates 
may also create the space for new firms to enter. We limit ourselves to exploring correlations, rather than 
estimating the causal impact of higher entry on exit.  
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Methods 
In seeking to estimate the impact of entry barriers on firm birth rates and the average 
size of newly-born firms, we follow the two broad methodologies that have been applied 
in the literature. The first of these (seen, for example, in the study by Desai et al, 2003) 
seeks to estimate regressions of birth rates (or average firm size) on measures of entry 
regulations using industry*country-level data. Industry fixed effects are used to control 
for industry characteristics that are common across all countries and which may be 
correlated with entry rates or entrant size (one example might be capital requirements). 
Other indicators of the business environment in each country (such as the availability of 
bank credit) are entered alongside the country-level measures of entry regulation in an 
attempt to reduce the chances of omitted variable bias at the country level. The 
specification is outlines in Equation 1 below. 
𝐵௥௝ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௥ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝑋௥ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐼௝ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑍௥௝ ൅ 𝜀௥௝     (Eq. 1) 
 
where: B is a measure of the firm birth rate in country r and industry j (or alternatively, 
a measure of average firm size); Regulation is a measure of entry regulation in country 
r; X is a vector of additional country characteristics; I is a set of industry dummies; and 
Z is a vector of additional controls at the industry*country level. One expects the 
coefficient 𝛽ଵto be negative if higher entry regulations are associated with lower entry 
rates.   
 
Causal inference is difficult in this empirical framework, however, as omitted country 
characteristics may still be jointly driving the nature of entry barriers and economic 
outcomes. As noted earlier, some (e.g. Klapper et al, 2006) have addressed this problem 
through the use of a ‘difference-in-differences’ (DiD) approach which focuses on the 
difference in economic outcomes between more and less-affected industries within a 
given country or region. This approach allows the analyst to include fixed effects at both 
the industry and country-level, thus reducing fears about omitted variables. The 
empirical specification is as follows:  
𝐵௥௝ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ൫𝐷𝑦𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚௝. 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௥൯ ൅ 𝛽ଶ𝐶௥ ൅ 𝛽ଷ𝐼௝ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝑍௥௝ ൅ 𝜀௥௝   (Eq. 2) 
 
where: B, I and Regulation are defined as per Equation 1; C is a set of country dummies; 
Dynamism is a measure of the ‘natural’ level of business dynamism (in this case, birth 
rates) in industry j; and Z is again a vector of controls at the industry*country level. The 
critical coefficient is again 𝛽ଵ, which one expects to be negative if entry regulations are 
reducing the difference in entry rates between high and low-entry industries.   
 
One limitation of this approach is that one is unable to obtain an estimate of the average 
effect of entry regulations on the economic outcome of interest; instead, one obtains an 
estimate of the relative effect on high-entry vs low-entry industries. However, the 
approach is likely to get closer to the causal effect of entry regulations on national 
economic outcomes than the alternative approach mentioned earlier.  
To give a view of the potential ‘second-order’ effects of lowering entry barriers, we first 
repeat the methods outlined above, after replacing the dependent variable with the share 
of high-growth firms. To complete the analysis, we then also follow Brandt (2004) in 
looking more broadly at the correlation between entry rates and measures of business 
dynamics (specifically, death rates and the share of high-growth firms).12 The 
specification for this final component of the analysis is as follows: 
𝐷௥௝ ௧ ൌ 𝛽଴ ൅ 𝛽ଵ𝐵௥ ௝ ௧ି௜ ൅ 𝛽ସ𝐶௥ ൅ 𝛽ହ𝐼௝ ൅ 𝛽଺𝑇௧ ൅ 𝜀௥௝ ௧   (Eq. 3) 
                                                 
12 Such an analysis may also seek to focus on gazelles, but the measure provided in Eurostat’s Business 
Demography Statistics (the share of all firms that are gazelles) represents the combination of the overall 
firm birth rate and the rate of growth among the newly-born. Ideally, we would like a measure of the share 
of newly-born enterprises that are high-growth, but this is not provided. 
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where:  D is either the firm death rate or the share of high-growth firms in industry j in 
country r at time t; B is the birth rate in industry j in country r at time t; C, I and T are 
sets of country, industry and time dummies; and i takes the value 0, 1 or 2 to specify 
lagged terms which allow for delayed effects of up to two years. This informal 
specification seeks to assess whether there is a positive relationship within 
industry*country cells between the rate at which firms are entering the market and the 
rate at which firms are either growing or exiting. The specification is estimated on 
multiple years of data, with year fixed effects, in order to smooth any temporal volatility 
in the estimated relationships (such as may be caused by generalised economic shocks).  
Data on business dynamics 
To provide measures of business dynamics at the country level, we rely on data from 
Eurostat’s series of Business Demography Statistics. Specifically, we utilise data on firm 
birth rates, the average size of newly-born enterprises, death rates and the share of 
high-growth firms (see Appendix 1.A for definitions and further details). We restrict our 
attention to NACE Rev. 2 Sectors B-N (after excluding Division 64.2 ‘Activities of holding 
companies’) and extract data series at industry*country level for the year 2015 (the 
latest year of data available). After omitting countries with substantial amounts of 
missing data, we arrive at a sample of 44 industries across 25 countries. We use the data 
for the UK to estimate the ‘natural’ firm birth rate in the absence of entry barriers, since 
the UK has one of the lowest levels of entry regulation in Europe. The UK is thus 
excluded from all of our ‘first-order’ regressions, leaving us with a maximum sample size 
of 1,056 observations. We have two sets of estimates: one pertaining only to limited 
liability firms (since the World Bank Doing Business indicators for starting a business 
refer specifically to the process of incorporation) and another pertaining to all firms (so 
as to be able to observe any aggregate effects). Limited liability firms account for around 
40% of all firms in NACE Rev 2. Sections B-N in Spain, but around 70% of all 
employment.13  
For the inter-regional analysis within Spain, the Eurostat Regional Business Demography 
Statistics prove to have significant limitations, as they are available for only eight 
aggregated sectors, are not split by legal status and extend only to 2014. Consequently, 
we turn to other sources to obtain detailed industry-level data for each of Spain’s 
Autonomous Cities and Communities (NUTS2 regions) in 2015. We obtain firm birth rates 
at industry*region level from the Spanish Statistical Office (INE) series on Harmonised 
Business Demography. This series offers data for each of 72 Divisions across Sections B-
N of the NACE Rev. 2 classification, split by legal status. Data are not provided for the 
Basque Country, due to the unavailability of some primary sources, and we omit the 
Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, leaving a total of 16 regions. We 
thus have a maximum of 1,152 observations. We use the same source to provide data on 
firm death rates.  
Unfortunately, INE provide no detailed industry*region estimates of the average size of 
newly-born enterprises, nor of the share of high-growth firms. We sought to obtain both 
from the SABI database, but the rate of firm birth observed in SABI was too low to be 
credible and so we have had to omit any analysis of the average size of births from our 
inter-regional analysis. The share of high-growth firms estimated by SABI did match 
reasonably well at the national level with that suggested by official statistics, however, 
and so SABI provides our estimates of the shares of high-growth firms at industry*region 
level (again for 72 industry Divisions in each of 16 regions).  
                                                 
13 Estimates calculated from the Eurostat Business Demography Statistics.  
One additional issue that arises in the measurement of business dynamics when 
operating at the inter-regional, rather than the inter-country level, is that the firm-level 
estimates provided by INE and SABI are likely to suffer from a degree of ‘headquarter 
bias’. Such a bias may arise if multi-establishment firms tend to locate their headquarters 
in particular regions (say that of the capital city). In this situation, the growth of the firm 
will be attributed to the region hosting the headquarters, even though this growth may 
actually have occurred across plants in other regions. Such biases are generally 
unavoidable in the absence of detailed plant-level statistics, but we are able to address 
the issue to some extent in the SABI data by restricting our attention to firms with fewer 
than 250 employees. We also note that the degree of headquarter bias is considered to 
be lower in Spain than in many other countries (OECD, 2017b: 86). Further details and 
sources of the sub-regional data are provided in Appendix 1.B.  
Data on entry barriers 
To provide measures of the entry barriers facing new firms at country-level or across the 
regions of Spain, we turn to the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) reports, as presented 
in Figures 2.5 to 2.7.  
As noted earlier, the DB country-level reports provide measures of the number of 
procedures required to register a business, along with the time taken (in days), the cost 
of any fees levied, and the minimum capital requirement. They are distinct from the 
OECD measures of entry barriers, but feed into the indices of economic freedom compiled 
by the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation. The DB indicators are based on 
information about a stylised case (specifically, the administrative environment facing a 
limited liability firm providing general industrial or commercial activities in the capital city 
of each country), so as to harmonise measurement across time and space. Accordingly, 
the measures are not based on the ‘lived experience’ of any one firm, nor do they show 
the mean experience of all firms. They ought to indicate the experience of the median 
firm, however, and they have the advantage of being annual. We take the data for 2015 
so as to match our data on business dynamics.14  
Measures of the regional variation in entry barriers within Spain come from the DB 2015 
sub-national report for Spain. This report provided measures of the number of 
procedures required to register a business in each NUTS2 region, along with the time 
taken (in days) and the cost of any fees levied.15 Measures were collected for the 
standard case of a limited liability firm providing general industrial or commercial 
activities and for an industrial firm manufacturing steel products (see Figures 2.6 and 
2.7); we use both series, taking the barriers facing an industrial firm as those pertaining 
in NACE Rev. 2 Sections B-E and taking the barriers facing a general firm as those 
pertaining in Sections F-N.  
Again, Appendices A and B provide further detail on definitions and sources.  
                                                 
14 The DB approach has been criticised in some quarters because individual countries’ 
ranking positions have been shown to vary considerably over time as a result of 
temporal changes to the methodology of computing each country’s ‘distance to the 
frontier’ (The Economist, 2018). We use only a single year of DB data (thus avoiding 
inconsistencies in measurement over time). For our focal measures of entry barriers, 
we also follow the recommendations of an earlier independent review of the DB 
methodology (Manuel et al, 2003) by utilising specific indicators of procedural 
requirements and costs, in preference to the aggregated ‘distance to the frontier’ 
rankings. Further information on the DB methodology is presented at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology  
15 The minimum capital requirement did not vary by region within Spain.  
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1.5. Results 
National sample 
In simple bivariate regressions using our industry*country-level sample (not shown), we 
find a negative association between the extent of the entry barriers and industry birth 
rates. Countries with higher entry costs and higher minimum capital requirements have 
lower birth rates, whilst the average size of newly-born enterprises is larger in countries 
with more extensive entry procedures. However, these associations could reflect a 
variety of omitted variables. The left-hand panel of Table 1.2 thus presents the results of 
analyses which control for a range of other features of the business environment, as 
measured in Doing Business, following the specification set out in Equation 1 in Section 
6.4.16 Here we see that, after controlling for these other features of the business 
environment and industry fixed-effects, the association with levels of paid-up capital 
remains statistically significant: firm birth rates are found to be lower in countries with a 
higher minimum capital requirement (model 4) and the result holds after entering all four 
measures of entry requirement alongside one another (model 5). This association is 
slightly stronger when focusing on entry rates for limited liability firms (upper panel) 
than when focusing on the entry rate for all firms (lower panel), but this is to be 
expected, given that the requirements for paid-up capital typically pertain only to limited 
liability firms.17  
The coefficient of -0.427 for all firms implies that a one standard deviation increase in the 
minimum capital requirement in a country is associated with a 1.1 percentage point 
reduction (on average) in the birth rate within an industry*country cell. To put this in 
context, the mean birth rate across industry*country cells in our sample is 9.3 per cent, 
with a standard deviation of 5.3 percentage points. Thus, an increase in one standard 
deviation in the minimum capital requirement is associated with a reduction of one fifth 
of a standard deviation in the birth rate: a modest but still notable elasticity.  
The right-hand panel of Table 1.2 then shows the association between the level of entry 
requirements and the average size of newly-born firms. Here, more extensive entry 
procedures and higher entry costs are each associated with a larger average size of 
entrants, both in respect of limited liability firms and all firms (model 10). The elasticities 
are similar to that noted above: increases of one standard deviation in the number of 
procedures and the extent of entry costs are each associated with increases of around 
one fifth of a standard deviation in the average size of newly-born enterprises.  
Table 1.3 goes on to present the DiD models, following the specification set out in 
Equation 2. Here the model controls for a full set of country-level fixed effects and the 
coefficients now indicate whether the firm birth rate is lower in industries with a high 
‘natural’ propensity for entry than it is in industries with a low ‘natural’ propensity when 
the country has higher entry barriers. The results suggest that some of the associations 
seen in Table 1.2 may have been caused by unobserved country-level characteristics. In 
the DiD models, lengthier and more costly entry requirements are found to be negatively 
associated with the birth rates for limited liability firms (models 2 and 3), whilst higher 
minimum capital requirements are found to be positively associated with the size of 
entrants (model 8). The coefficients are generally smaller when looking at the outcomes 
                                                 
16 These additional features are listed in the notes to the table.  
17 The coefficients on the other measures of the business environment are not shown, for reasons of brevity. 
However, ‘better’ scores on these measures typically attract positive coefficients, with measures of the 
ease of registering property and the ease of enforcing contracts being statistically significant. The measure 
of the ease of trading across borders is the only one to have a statistically significant negative association 
with firm birth rates. 
for all firms, but the negative association between the time needed to fulfil entry 
requirements and the firm birth rate remains statistically significant under this 
perspective.  
To provide some interpretation of these DiD estimates, we can look at the difference in 
birth rates between an industry such as the manufacture of leather products (NACE Rev. 
2 Division 15), which sits at the 25th percentile of UK sectoral birth rates (birth rate of 
11% in 2015), and an industry such as computer programming and IT consultancy 
(NACE Rev. 2 Division 62), which sits at the 75th percentile of this distribution (birth rate 
of 16% in the UK in 2015). The coefficient of -0.094 in the lower panel of Table 1.3 
suggests that moving from Spain (which sits at the 75th percentile of the distribution on 
entry time in 2015) to Portugal (which sits at the 25th percentile) would raise the 
difference in birth rates between these two sectors by around 0.5 percentage points.18 
The mean difference in birth rates between these two sectors across the countries in our 
sample is 4 percentage points, again suggesting a modest but notable effect of entry 
barrier on firm birth rates.  
In summary, these results accord broadly with the extant literature, suggesting that 
market entry barriers do continue to depress firm birth rates and to raise the average 
size of entrants in European countries in 2015.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 For comparison, Klapper et al (2006) estimate that moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in the 
distribution of entry costs (their focus) also raises the difference in entry rates between the sectors at the 25th 
and 75th percentile of the distribution of entry rates by 0.5 percentage points.  
  
Table 1.2: Fixed-effects estimates of the impact of entry barriers on birth rates and the size of newly-born enterprises, country sample, 2015 
 Birth rate Ln(Average size of newly-born enterprises) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Limited liability firms:           
Ln(Procedures) -0.578    -0.622 0.721***    0.630*** 
 [-0.30]    [-0.44] [3.77]    [3.31] 
Ln(Time)  -0.218   0.228  0.014   -0.085 
  [-0.28]   [0.43]  [0.10]   [-0.75] 
Ln(Cost)   0.153  -0.063   0.150***  0.110*** 
   [0.33]  [-0.15]   [2.99]  [2.93] 
Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.465*** -0.476***    0.002 0.005 
    [-3.32] [-3.39]    [0.11] [0.24] 
Observations 927 927 927 927 927 778 778 778 778 778 
Goodness of fit 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.55 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.57 
           
All firms:           
Ln(Procedures) -1.379    -0.486 0.368**    0.263* 
 [-0.51]    [-0.18] [2.53]    [1.80] 
Ln(Time)  -1.360*   -0.806  0.135**   0.065 
  [-1.85]   [-1.30]  [2.11]   [1.26] 
Ln(Cost)   -0.365  -0.447   0.084***  0.066** 
   [-0.61]  [-0.76]   [3.14]  [2.52] 
Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.419* -0.427**    0.018 0.019 
    [-1.84] [-2.10]    [1.06] [1.26] 
Observations 954 954 954 954 954 915 915 915 915 915 
Goodness of fit 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.52 
Notes: The estimates in columns (1)-(5) are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina 
pseudo-R2; those in columns (6)-(10) are from OLS regressions with goodness of fit measured via adjusted-R2. All regressions include a constant, the 
industry share of value-added by country, a full set of industry dummies, and the country’s Doing Business ‘distance-to-the-frontier’ scores for: getting 
electricity; registering property; getting credit; protecting minority investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts; and resolving 
insolvency. Standard errors are clustered by country. Key to statistical significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.A for variable 
definitions and sources.   
Table 1.3: Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of entry barriers on birth rates and the size of newly-born enterprises, country 
sample, 2015 
 Birth rate Ln(Average size of newly-born enterprises) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Limited liability firms:         
EntryUK*Ln(Procedures) -0.005    -0.017    
 [-0.09]    [-1.42]    
EntryUK*Ln(Time)  -0.061*    0.007   
  [-1.92]    [0.83]   
EntryUK*Ln(Cost)   -0.029*    -0.000  
   [-1.89]    [-0.03]  
EntryUK*Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.003    0.003* 
    [-0.32]    [1.86] 
Observations 927 927 927 927 778 778 778 778 
Goodness of fit 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
         
All firms:         
EntryUK*Ln(Procedures) -0.012    -0.003    
 [-0.20]    [-0.59]    
EntryUK*Ln(Time)  -0.094**    0.003   
  [-2.29]    [0.70]   
EntryUK*Ln(Cost)   -0.004    0.001  
   [-0.23]    [0.49]  
EntryUK*Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.000    0.001 
    [-0.02]    [1.23] 
Observations 954 954 954 954 915 915 915 915 
Goodness of fit 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Notes: The estimates in columns (1)-(4) are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina 
pseudo-R2; those in columns (5)-(8) are from OLS regressions with goodness of fit measured via adjusted-R2. All regressions include a constant, the 
industry share of value-added by country, a full set of industry dummies and a full set of country dummies. Standard errors are clustered by country. Key 
to statistical significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.A for variable definitions and sources.   
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The second phase of our industry*country-level analysis examines the potential 
implications of lower entry barriers for broader levels of business dynamism and growth.  
First, we repeat the specifications presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 but take the share of 
high-growth enterprises as the dependent variable.19 The results are shown in Table 1.4. 
Here we see a predominance of negative coefficients, but none of them are statistically 
significant from zero at the 10 per cent level, either under the fixed-effects or DiD 
specifications.  This suggests that any impact that entry barriers may have on levels of 
firm growth are too weak to be robustly identified in our sample.  
Table 1.4: Fixed-effects and difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of entry 
barriers on the share of high-growth enterprises, country sample, 2015 
 Share of high-growth enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fixed-effect estimates:      
Ln(Procedures) 0.365    0.551 
 [0.17]    [0.25] 
Ln(Time)  -0.708   -0.699 
  [-0.64]   [-0.69] 
Ln(Cost)   0.200  0.159 
   [0.37]  [0.27] 
Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.207 -0.177 
    [-0.99] [-0.78] 
Observations 921 921 921 921 921 
Goodness of fit 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 
      
Difference-in-difference 
estimates: 
     
Ln(Procedures) -0.112     
 [-1.47]     
Ln(Time)  -0.072    
  [-1.34]    
Ln(Cost)   0.021   
   [1.34]   
Ln(Minimum capital)    -0.009  
    [-0.78]  
Observations 921 921 921 921  
Goodness of fit 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  
Notes: For fixed-effects estimates, see the notes to Table 1.2. For difference-in-differences 
estimates, see the notes to Table 1.3.  
This is not to say that birth rates do not matter for levels of business dynamism and 
growth, however. Table 1.5 takes our industry*country dataset and pools over four 
years (2012-2015), controlling for country, industry and year fixed-effects (following 
                                                 
19 We have no measure of employment growth within limited liability firms, so our analysis focuses on rates for 
all firms.  
equation 3 in Section 2.4). Birth rates are found to be strongly correlated with firm death 
rates and with the shares of high-growth firms under this analysis.  
The size of the coefficients on the firm birth rate do not increase monotonically with the 
length of the lag, as is the case in Brandt’s (2004) analysis. And in additional analyses 
(not shown) we find no statistically significant association between birth rates and rates 
of productivity growth.20 However, the results in Table 1.5 do suggest that higher entry 
rates not only bring new firms into the market but also contribute to greater levels of 
market dynamism more generally. 
Taken together, the full set of results indicates that the height of entry barriers does 
depress firm birth rates and raises the average size of newly-born enterprises. However, 
the lowering of entry barriers is not sufficient, on its own, to raise overall levels of 
business dynamism and growth. 
Table 1.5: Conditional correlations between birth rates and death rates, and between 
birth rates and the share of high-growth firms, country sample, 2012-2015 
 Death rate Share of high-growth enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Birth rate at lags:       
       
0 0.262***   0.059***   
 [21.45]   [3.18]   
1  0.225***   0.059***  
  [18.69]   [3.25]  
2   0.240***   0.035* 
   [20.35]   [1.94] 
Observations 4145 4024 3963 3968 3861 3807 
Pseudo-R2 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Notes: The estimates are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of 
fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2. All regressions include a constant and 
full sets of industry, country and time dummies. Key to statistical significance: *** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.A for variable definitions and sources.   
 
Regional sample 
The analysis of our industry*region sample proceeds in the same vein as that discussed 
above for the national sample, with the exception that we have no data on the size of 
newly-born enterprises at industry*region level within Spain. Recall, also, that our 
measure of entry barriers is more nuanced, as it takes account of the different 
requirements applying to industrial and non-industrial activities.  
In bivariate regressions (not shown), regions with more extensive entry procedures are 
found to have lower birth rates for limited liability firms, but there are no statistically 
significant associations with the time or cost of fulfilling entry requirements. The upper 
panel of Table 1.6 shows that the nature of these associations remains once we control 
for those other elements of the business environment that are measured in the DB 
                                                 
20 Brandt (2004: 21-22) showed a positive association, but only with total factor productivity growth. Our 
measure is of the growth in value-added per worker.  
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report for Spain (the ease of obtaining construction permits, the ease of getting 
electricity and the ease of registering property). The coefficients are generally smaller 
when we use birth rates for all firms (the lower panel of Table 1.6) and the length of 
entry procedures, in particular, is no longer statistically significant in the regional sample 
under this perspective. 
Table 1.6: Fixed-effects estimates of the impact of entry barriers on birth rates, regional 
sample, 2015 
 Birth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Limited liability firms:     
     
Ln(Procedures) -2.871*   -3.291* 
 [-1.74]   [-1.69] 
Ln(Time)  -0.062  0.162 
  [-0.10]  [0.23] 
Ln(Cost)   0.220 0.621 
   [0.28] [0.78] 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 1066 
Pseudo-R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
     
All firms:     
     
Ln(Procedures) -1.667   -1.528 
 [-0.74]   [-0.61] 
Ln(Time)  -0.321  -0.214 
  [-0.34]  [-0.20] 
Ln(Cost)   -0.307 -0.117 
   [-0.36] [-0.13] 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 1066 
Pseudo-R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Notes: All estimates are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of 
fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2. All regressions include a constant, the 
industry share of enterprises by region, a full set of industry dummies, and the region’s Doing 
Business ‘distance-to-the-frontier’ scores for: getting electricity; registering property; and 
dealing with construction permits. Standard errors are clustered by region. Key to statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.B for variable definitions and 
sources.   
 
Table 1.7 presents the results of the DiD analysis on our industry*region sample. To 
interpret the coefficient on the length of entry procedures in this model, we can look 
again at the implied difference in birth rates between the leather industry and the 
computing/IT consultancy industry. The coefficient implies that moving from the region 
at the 75th percentile in the distribution of procedural steps (Castilla and Leon) to the 
region at the 25th percentile (Extremadura) – a shift of approximately one standard 
deviation in the distribution of procedural steps within Spain – reduces the difference in 
birth rates between these high and low birth-rate industries by 0.15 percentage points. 
The effect is therefore around one third of the size of that estimated at the national level 
in respect of a shift in the time required to complete these procedural steps.  
The results indicate that, just as at the national level, the height of entry barriers does 
affect firm birth rates. Specifically, within Spain, those Autonomous Cities and 
Communities which use their devolved powers to implement lengthier entry procedures 
for new firms do indeed have a lower rate of firm entry into their local market than those 
Autonomous Cities and Communities with shorter entry procedures. However, the 
differences in entry procedures between the regions of Spain appear less important, 
economically, than the differences in entry procedures between Spain and other 
countries in Europe.  
 
Table 1.7: Difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of entry barriers on birth 
rates, regional sample, 2015 
 Birth rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Limited liability firms:    
    
EntryUK*Ln(Procedures) -0.237*   
 [-1.96]   
EntryUK*Ln(Time)  -0.013  
  [-0.32]  
EntryUK*Ln(Cost)   0.066 
   [0.87] 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 
Pseudo-R2 0.37 0.37 0.37 
    
All firms:    
    
EntryUK*Ln(Procedures) -0.171   
 [-1.26]   
EntryUK*Ln(Time)  -0.015  
  [-0.28]  
EntryUK*Ln(Cost)   0.066 
   [0.86] 
Observations 1066 1066 1066 
Pseudo-R2 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Notes: All estimates are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of 
fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2. All regressions include a constant, the 
industry share of enterprises by region, a full set of industry dummies and a full set of region 
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by region. Key to statistical significance: *** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.B for variable definitions and sources.   
 
Table 1.8 then repeats the specifications presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 but takes the 
share of high-growth enterprises as the dependent variable. As in the country-level 
analysis, none of the coefficients are statistically significant from zero at the 10 per cent 
level, either under the fixed-effects or DiD specifications. Again, this suggests that any 
impact that entry barriers may have on levels of firm growth within Spain are too weak 
to be robustly identified in our sample.  
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Table 1.8: Fixed-effects and difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of entry 
barriers on the share of high-growth enterprises, regional sample, 2015 
 Share of high-growth enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed-effect estimates:     
Ln(Procedures) -3.958   -5.053 
 [-0.68]   [-0.78] 
Ln(Time)  1.610  1.986 
  [0.48]  [0.56] 
Ln(Cost)   0.102 0.734 
   [0.04] [0.35] 
Observations 967 967 967 967 
Goodness of fit 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
     
Difference-in-difference 
estimates: 
    
Ln(Procedures) -0.824    
 [-0.80]    
Ln(Time)  0.253   
  [0.79]   
Ln(Cost)   0.481  
   [1.54]  
Observations 967 967 967  
Goodness of fit 0.22 0.22 0.22  
Notes: For fixed-effects estimates, see the notes to Table 1.6. For difference-in-differences 
estimates, see the notes to Table 1.7.  
 
Table 1.9 then looks more directly as the association between entry rates and levels of 
business dynamism (cf Table 1.5). The left-hand panel shows the results of regressing 
the firm death rate in each industry*region on the firm birth rate, both 
contemporaneously and with lags. The results are similar to those found in the national 
sample, except that here the positive relationship between entry and exit is only found in 
the first and second lag.  
The right-hand panel shows the results of regressing the share of high-growth 
enterprises in each industry*region on the firm birth rate. Here, we also find a positive 
association, but only on the second lag. The association between rates of entry and rates 
of within-firm employment growth thus seems weaker within Spain than it is across 
Europe as a whole (though we cannot discount the possibility that the differences may 
also be a function of our use of an alternative data source for the share of high-growth 
firms).21  
  
                                                 
21 Replacing the birth rate for all firms with the birth rate for limited liability firms does not change the pattern 
of results.  
Table 1.9: Conditional correlations between birth rates and death rates, and between 
birth rates and the share of high-growth firms, regional sample, 2015 
 Death rate Share of high-growth enterprises 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Birth rate at lags:       
       
0 -0.052   -0.335   
 [-1.33]   [-1.43]   
1  0.261***   0.001  
  [7.70]   [0.01]  
2   0.208***   0.546** 
   [5.67]   [2.44] 
Observations 1072 1068 1067 968 967 967 
Pseudo-R2 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Notes: The estimates are from Tobit regressions, with left-censoring at zero and goodness of 
fit measured via the McKelvey-Zavoina pseudo-R2. All regressions include a constant and 
full sets of industry and region dummies. Key to statistical significance: *** p<0.01; ** 
p<0.05; * p<0.10. See Appendix 1.B for variable definitions and sources.   
 
1.6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Theory and empirical evidence supports the view that higher entry requirements can 
hamper the creation of new firms, thereby muting the dynamism of the market, with 
attendant consequences for business competitiveness and growth. In spite of a number 
of reforms that have been undertaken by the government of Spain over recent years, 
the barriers facing potential entrants remain higher than in many other major, advanced 
economies. They also vary to notable degrees across Spain’s nineteen Autonomous Cities 
and Communities. The extent of such barriers is seen as an impediment to further 
progress in boosting the dynamism and competitiveness of Spain’s economy (OECD, 
2017a; European Commission, 2017).  
In this chapter, we combined quantitative indicators of the barriers to entry for new 
firms with the latest available data on business demography in order to re-evaluate the 
relationship between entry barriers and business dynamics at the present time. We 
undertook analyses at the level of the nation state, comparing Spain with other major 
European economies, and also at the regional level, exploring the implications of inter-
regional heterogeneity in entry requirements between Spain’s Autonomous Cities and 
Communities.  
In both samples, we found that the height of entry barriers depresses firm birth rates 
and raises the average size of newly-born enterprises. We also presented evidence of 
the positive correlation between firm birth rates and other aspects of business 
dynamism, namely exit rates and the share of high-growth firms. However, we found no 
statistically significant direct association between the height of entry barriers and rates 
of firm growth.  
Our results imply that further reforms to the administrative environment governing 
business entry in Spain – both at the national and regional level – would yield economic 
benefits in terms of higher rates of business creation. When considering possible 
avenues for future reform, our results suggest that initiatives to reduce the number of 
procedural steps needed to register a business, to reduce the time taken to complete 
these steps, and to reduce the cost of registration could all bring benefits. Prior 
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experience in other countries (and to some extent, within Spain itself) suggests a 
number of potential avenues for continued reform. For instance, further promotion of the 
use of ‘one-stop’ shops and online registration procedures, which have seen greater use 
in Spain in recent years, and which have brought considerable benefits in countries such 
as Portugal and Mexico, will help to reduce procedural delays. Further promotion of the 
sets of model byelaws, as are now used in a large number of countries, and which were 
introduced in Spain in 2015, will also help to speed up processing times. Spain has 
already made progress in these areas in recent years, but our analysis suggests that 
further gains can yet be realised.  
However, our analysis suggests that the lowering of entry barriers is not sufficient, on its 
own, to raise overall levels of business dynamism and growth. Although there is a 
positive relationship between birth rates and indicators of business churn and growth, we 
found no statistically significant direct association between such indicators and the 
height of entry regulations, reinforcing the view that other factors are important. Some 
of these potential factors will be explored in the chapters which follow. 
 
 
  
Appendix 1.A: Variable definitions and sources for country-level sample 
 
Variable Definition and source 
Industry*country-level variables: 
Birth rate Number of enterprise births in year t divided by the number of 
enterprises active in year t. Source: Eurostat Business Demography 
(indicator V97020) 
Average size of 
newly-born 
enterprises 
Logarithm of the number of persons employed in year t among 
enterprises born in year t divided by the number of enterprises born in 
year t. Source: Eurostat Business Demography (indicator V97121) 
Death rate Number of enterprise deaths in year t divided by the number of 
enterprises active in year t. Source: Eurostat Business Demography 
(indicator V97030) 
Share of high-
growth 
enterprises 
Number of high-growth enterprises in year t divided by the number of 
active enterprises with at least 10 employees in year t. A high-growth 
enterprise is an enterprise with >10% average annualised growth in 
the number of employees over a three-year period (t – 3 to t) and 
having at least 10 employees in the beginning of the period (t – 3). 
Source: Eurostat Business Demography (indicator V97460). 
Industry share 
of value-added 
Value-added in industry i and country j as a share of total value-added 
for country j. Source: Eurostat Structural Business Statistics.  
Country-level variables: 
Entry 
procedures 
Logarithm of the number of interactions with external parties that are 
required to start a limited liability company in the capital city of 
country j. Source: Doing Business 2015 
Entry time Logarithm of the time (in days) required to start a limited liability 
company in the capital city of country j. Source: Doing Business 2015 
Entry cost Logarithm of the cost (as a % of income per capita) of all fees required 
to start a limited liability company in the capital city of country j. 
Source: Doing Business 2015 
Minimum capital 
requirement 
Logarithm of the minimum paid-in capital (as a % of income per 
capita) required to start a limited liability company in the capital city of 
country j. Source: Doing Business 2015 
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Appendix 1.B: Variable definitions and sources for region-level sample 
Variable Definition and source 
Industry*region-level variables: 
Birth rate Number of enterprise births in year t divided by the number of 
enterprises active in year t. Source: INE Harmonised Business 
Demography (Tables 01004 and 01002) 
Death rate Number of enterprise deaths in year t divided by the number of 
enterprises active in year t. Source: INE Harmonised Business 
Demography (Tables 01010 and 01002) 
Share of high-
growth 
enterprises 
Among enterprises with <250 employees: the number of high-growth 
enterprises in year t divided by the number of active enterprises with 
at least 10 employees in year t. See Appendix 1.A for the definition of 
‘high-growth’. Source: SABI Database. 
Industry share 
of enterprises 
Number of enterprises in industry i and region j as a share of the total 
number of enterprises in region j. Source: INE Harmonised Business 
Statistics (Table 01002).  
Region-level variables: 
Entry 
procedures 
Logarithm of the number of interactions with external parties that are 
required to start a limited liability company in the capital city of region 
j (for NACE Rev. 2 Sections B-E: a limited liability company engaged in 
industrial production). Source: Doing Business in Spain 2015 
Entry time Logarithm of the time (in days) required to start a limited liability 
company in the capital city of region j (for NACE Rev. 2 Sections B-E: 
a limited liability company engaged in industrial production). Source: 
Doing Business in Spain 2015 
Entry cost Logarithm of the cost (as % of income per capita) of fees required to 
start a limited liability company in the capital city of region j (for NACE 
Rev. 2 Sections B-E: a limited liability company engaged in industrial 
production). Source: Doing Business in Spain 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
